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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
FRANKLIN BUTLER, : Case No. 20060327-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2002). This case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. Appellant 
Franklin Butler was convicted of an enhanced count for distributing, or agreeing, 
consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute, a controlled substance, a first degree 
felony offense under Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) and 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2005). 
(See R. 83-85). A copy of the judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for an enhanced 
count of distributing, or agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute, a 
controlled substance under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2005). 
Standard of Review: A sufficiency issue is reviewed as follows: 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We will reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citing numerous 
cases). An observation made by this court in Petree bears repeating here: 
[Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this 
Court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment 
of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing 
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not 
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in 
order to sustain a verdict. 
State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^|15, 63 P.3d 94 (citing Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue on appeal was preserved in the record at 104:89-94. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision is relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On October 21, 2005, the state charged Butler with distributing, or agreeing, 
consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute, a controlled or counterfeit substance 
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) with enhancements. (R. 1-4). On December 
15, 2005, the court conducted a preliminary hearing, and bound the defendant over for 
trial on the charge. (R. 33-34; 103). 
On January 31, 2006, the trial court conducted a jury trial in the matter. (R. 104). 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Butler guilty of distributing, or agreeing, 
consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute, a controlled or counterfeit substance, and 
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it found an enhancement for the offense. (R. 48-50). 
On March 27, 2006, the trial court sentenced Butler to a term of 365 days with 
credit for time served. (R. 83-85). On April 4, 2006, Butler filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R. 90-91). He is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state presented the following evidence at trial. On October 16, 2005 (R. 104: 
17, 21), five members of the Salt Lake City Police vice squad drove undercover in a large 
van to the area of280 South and 500 West. (R. 104:21,34,83). It was between 11:00 
p.m. and midnight. (R. 104:21, 56, 71). The five were looking for prostitution offenses. 
(R. 104:21-22, 71). 
As the van proceeded northbound on 500 West from 400 South to 300 South, 
several individuals waved to get the attention of the occupants. (R. 104:24-26, 34, 57, 
71, 84). As the van continued along 500 West to 250 South, Henry Smith and/or Butler 
waved or nodded to the van. (R. 104:26, 57, 64). At that time the officers decided to 
arrange a drug transaction. (R. 104:26). Detective Johnson, the driver, continued around 
a comer and pulled over so that Sergeant Holmes could move to the back seat and 
Detective Boelter could move to the front passenger's seat. (R. 104:26, 57, 84). 
The van then proceeded around the block again heading northbound on 400 West. 
(R. 104:27). As the van approached 250 South, Smith or Butler again attempted to get 
their attention. (R. 104:27, 57, 71). This time the van pulled over. (R. 104:27, 34-35). 
Smith and Butler "both approached the passenger's side window at the same time," 
and Detective Boelter asked, "What you got?" (R. 104:27, 32, 35, 58, 72, 84). Smith 
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answered, "What you want?" Boelter said, "You got rock?" meaning crack cocaine. (R. 
104:28). Butler then said, "How much you want? A hundred? They are big rocks." (R. 
104:28, 35). Boelter said he wanted 60, meaning sixty dollars worth. Smith said, "Okay, 
be right back." (R. 104:28, 58). Smith left. (R. 104:28, 32, 73). Butler was still at the 
window. (R. 104:32, 73, 85). 
Thereafter, Rodney Jones, who was standing on the sidewalk approximately 10 
feet behind Butler and Smith, approached the van. (R. 104:29-30). He had a small, 
brown piece of paper with six rocks of crack cocaine. (R. 104:30). Jones put three rocks 
into Boelter's hand. (R. 104:30, 59). Butler stood right there "and observed the entire 
transaction." (R. 104:32,59). 
Boelter then signaled to the other officers in the van to take the individuals into 
custody. (R. 104:30, 32, 59). The officers got out and arrested Smith, Jones, Butler, and 
a fourth person, Damon Williams. (R. 104:30). At the time of arrest, Williams "threw" a 
white substance from his mouth into the weeds. (R. 104:67-68, 74, 86). 
According to Boelter, individuals, who are involved in transacting a deal, usually 
do not carry drugs on them but will have somebody in the background. (R. 104:30-31, 
46-47). "[T]he individual that's approaching the window to make the initial transaction 
does not hold the money, does not hold the drugs, just [sort] of, basically, doing the 
transaction with whoever [sic] is in the car. The money [] is then taken back to another 
individual that is nearby in the area, along with the other individual that's holding the rest 
of the drugs." (R. 104:47). Once the original person has transacted the deal, "that 
individual will go wherever the source of the narcotics is held, the drugs are held, obtain 
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whatever deal was made, and then bring them back to the vehicle." (R. 104:31). The 
procedure protects the person with the drugs. (R. 104:31). 
Butler denied any involvement in the transaction. He testified that he was a 60-
year-old, disabled veteran living in the homeless shelter. (R. 104:95). On October 16, he 
was in the area behind the shelter on 500 West looking for work. He explained that 
people would drive up and hire residents from the shelter to do odd jobs, such as con-
struction, clean-up, painting, and moving. (R. 104:97-98, 103). He thought the people in 
the van were looking for workers. (R. 104:98). Butler approached the van to inquire. (R. 
104:98,106). He denied making statements about drugs. (R. 104:106). Butler witnessed 
the transaction, and was subsequently arrested. (R. 104:101-02, 106). 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury convicted Butler of facilitating a 
drug transaction with two or more other persons. (R. 104:133-36). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Butler maintains the evidence was insufficient to support that he committed the 
crime of distributing, or agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute, a 
controlled substance. Specifically, the evidence fails to support that Butler took steps to 
facilitate a drug distribution with others, and it fails to support any act on his part in 
furtherance of a distribution. The evidence fails to support that Butler engaged in con-
duct blowing or intending that a distribution "would, or would be likely to, occur." See 
State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ^9, 3 P.3d 725, cert denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300. Butler 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction due to insufficient evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION. 
A. THE SUFFICIENCY STANDARD. 
Butler was convicted of an enhanced count for distributing, or agreeing, 
consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute, a controlled substance, a first degree 
felony offense under Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) and 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2005). 
He maintains the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the conviction. 
"We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v. Smith, 927 
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The defendant must overcome a heavy burden in 
challenging the sufficiency of evidence for a jury verdict. See id.; State v. Vessey, 
967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "We view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), 
and "will reverse only if the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.'" Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (quoting Harman, 767 P.2d at 568 
(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983))). However, though the 
burden is high, it is not impossible. See id. "We will not make speculative leaps 
across gaps in the evidence." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
"Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. "To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State 
has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." 
Smith, 927?.2d sA 651. 
State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,^10, 2 P.3d 954; see a]so State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 
74, T[18, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ^17, 993 P.2d 232. 
To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant '"must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, «j|13, 
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25 P.3d 985 (quoting State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, TJ14, 989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991)). Proper marshaling requires the 
appellant to present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After 
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in original); see also Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, [^19, 
57 P.3d 1093 (stating that the party contesting the verdict must "assume the role of 
'devil's advocate'"). 
In the event the evidence presented at trial is contradictory or conflicting, so long 
as a reasonable interpretation of that evidence supports each element of the offense, this 
Court will not disturb the jury's verdict. "[W]e simply 'assume that the jury believed the 
evidence supporting the verdict.'" Boyd, 2001 UT 30, |14 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah 1993)); see also State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8, TJ42, 994 P.2d 177. 
[W]e do not sit as a second trier of fact: '"It is the exclusive function ofthejwy to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.1 So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \\6 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 
345 (Utah 1985); State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)); see also State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) ("When the evidence presented is conflicting 
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and 
the weight to be given particular evidence"); Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1213 ("[Credibility is an 
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issue for the trier of fact, in this case the jury. The jury necessarily accepts the testimony 
of certain witnesses and discounts conflicting testimony. Moreover, as a general rule, in 
reviewing a jury verdict we assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the 
verdict." (internal citations omitted)); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991) (the 
mere existence of conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal); State v. Cravens, 2000 
UT App 344, TJ18, 15 P.3d 635 ("it is the province of the trier of fact" to determine which 
testimony to believe and what inferences to draw from the facts (cites omitted)); State v. 
Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, «f30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may not weigh evidence or assess 
witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury believed the evidence and inferences 
that support the verdict'" (cite omitted)). 
Also, it is well settled that "ca conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial 
evidence.5" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997)). '"Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded 
as inferior evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction.'" Lyman, 966 
P.2d at 281 (quoting State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986)); see State v. Span, 
819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991). Where circumstantial evidence is presented, this Court 
must determine whether "the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a 
basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting Workman, 852 
P.2d at 985); James, 819 P.2d at 789 ("It is well established that intent can be proven by 
circumstantial evidence"). 
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Nevertheless, if the verdict "is based solely on inferences that give rise to only re-
mote or speculative possibilities of guilt," it is not legally valid. Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 
(quoting Workman, 852 P.2d at 985). Likewise, if the law will not sustain the conviction 
based on the facts, the conviction must be reversed. State v. Merila, 966 P.2d 270, 272 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). With that in mind, the function of a reviewing court is to ensure 
"that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the charge to enable a 
jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." Id. at 
272 (internal emphasis omitted) (quoting James, 819 P.2d at 784; State v. Warden, 813 
P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991)). 
As set forth below, the state failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that 
Butler committed the first-degree-felony offense. He respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the conviction. 
B. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS FOR 
DISTRIBUTING, OR OFFERING, AGREEING, OR ARRANGING TO 
DISTRIBUTE, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
1. Under Utah Law, the State Must Establish Intent and an Act in Furtherance of a 
Drug Distribution. 
Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) states the following: "Except as authorized by this 
chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally . . . (ii) distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2005). 
To make out a case for distributing, or agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging 
to distribute, a controlled substance, "the State must show that an offer, agreement, 
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consent, or arrangement to distribute controlled substances was made by the defendant 
and, whichever variation or variations it charges, that the behavior was 'engaged in 
knowingly or with intent that such distribution would, or would be likely to, occur."1 
State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, f9, 3 P.3d 725 (quoting State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 
922, 923 (Utah 1979)), cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000), abrogated on other grounds 
by State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300; Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii). That is, 
"any witting or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, in whatever form 
the aid takes, is proscribed by the act. In other words, any act in furtherance of 
'arranging] to distribute ... a ... controlled substance' constitutes a criminal offense 
pursuant to the statute." State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (ellipsis 
and emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986) 
(quoting State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923-24 (Utah 1979))). 
The actus reus under Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) requires an act in furtherance of a 
distribution, whether it results in a completed transaction or not. See Harrison, 601 P.2d 
at 923-24; Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at [^10. The word "furtherance" is defined as 
"helping forward," "advancement" or "promotion." Webster's New World College 
Dictionary, 575 (4th ed. 1999). 
The mens rea is established with proof of intent. "A defendant who offers to sell 
drugs with no actual intent of following through is not guilty of the offense of arranging." 
Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at ^10. 
Utah statutory law defines intent as the defendant's "conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (2003); see 
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also State v. Casias, 567 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Utah 1977) (defining intent). "Intent to 
commit a crime can be 'inferred from the actions of the defendant or from surrounding 
circumstances.'" Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at f l 1 (quoting State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 
1220, 1223 (Utah 1983)). "Proof of an actual sale is not an element of the crime of 
arranging, but such evidence 'may be helpful, or even necessary, in proving knowledge or 
intent' in certain types of cases." Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at [^11 (citing Harrison, 601 
P.2dat924n.5). 
In State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, an informant went to defendant's home in the 
evening for drugs. Id. at 923. From there, the defendant and informant went to a restau-
rant to make contact with the supplier. I d After the drug purchase, the informant and 
defendant returned to the defendant's home, and at the defendant's request, the informant 
"left a small quantity of marijuana" for the defendant "for setting up the buy." Id. 
The jury found defendant guilty of arranging the drug purchase, and he appealed. 
Defendant maintained that the criminal statute was overly broad, and the evidence was 
insufficient to support the charge. Id. at 923-24. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated that a statute may proscribe a broad spectrum of 
conduct so long as the outer limits of the prohibited conduct "are clearly defined." IdL at 
923. "The statute in question accomplishes this by specifying that any activity leading to 
or resulting in the distribution for value of a controlled substance must be engaged in 
knowingly or with intent that such distribution would, or would be likely to, occur." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Also, in connection with the sufficiency issue, the court noted that an actual 
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distribution or sale is not an element of the offense. Id. at 924 n.5. However, such 
evidence may be necessary to prove "knowledge or intent." Id.; see also State v. Renfro, 
735 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 1987) (in response to a request for drugs, defendant went into 
another room and returned with a shaving kit containing marijuana: defendant discussed 
the purchase, set a price, and agreed to make the exchange). 
While the court in Harrison did not identify those instances when proof of the sale 
would not be necessary to establish "intent," other Utah cases provide guidance. In State 
v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), officers targeted defendant as a drug 
distributor and intercepted his telephone calls. Id. at 1186-87. Officers recorded calls 
where defendant advised a caller that he was unable to obtain drugs for him/her and 
agreed to check around further; where a dealer was unable to obtain drags and defendant 
told him he knew "where something happen"; and where defendant provided his address 
to the buyer in connection with supplying marijuana. Id. at 1190. Those actions reflected 
that defendant was willing to be a link in the chain of drag distribution under Utah law. 
See also State v. Peterson, 841 P.2d21,23,25 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (defendant told a 
buyer that she would ask whether the seller could obtain cocaine for her, thereby 
supporting that defendant was willing to bring the buyer and seller together). 
In State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), an undercover officer 
attended a meeting at defendant's house. Defendant told the officer that the cocaine to be 
purchased was "extremely good." Id. at 68. He also made a telephone call to a third-party 
seller and drove around looking for him while the officer waited at the seller's house for 
cocaine. Id. at 68-69. When defendant returned, the parties repeated the details of an 
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agreed-upon cocaine transaction. Id. at 69. Even though the actual sale never took place, 
defendant's incriminating statements and conduct supported his willingness to facilitate 
the transaction. Id; see State v. Hicken, 659 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Utah 1983) (defendant 
telephoned dealer, confirmed details of the transaction, and drove buyer to dealer); State 
v, Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (defendant facilitated the transaction 
between the undercover agent and supplier by directing the agent to drive to a store 
where they would make a call; the supplier was at the store in the phone booth; when the 
agent expressed discomfort with the defendant, he left and the transaction between the 
parties was consummated later at a different location); see also State v. Ontiveros, 674 
P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 1983) (recognizing the "classic case of arranging" where defendant 
made a telephone call for drugs, drove with the undercover agent to the location, 
procured the money from the agent, and returned with the drugs). 
The above cases support that defendant took "active steps to facilitate the comple-
tion of an illicit transaction." Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at ^12. Defendant had the ability 
to complete the transaction, or was willing to bring the parties together for a drug deal. 
[Sufficient evidence for the charge] could include that [defendant] made phone 
calls seeking drugs, see Gallegos, 851 P.2d at 1190; drove around looking for 
drugs, see Clark, 783 P.2d at 68-69; commented to [the undercover officer] on 
how the drugs were to be acquired, see [People v. May, 224 Cal. App. 2d 436, 36 
Cal. Rptr. 715, 717 (Cal. 2d 1964)]; was seen conferring with known drug 
suppliers, see Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1187; or was shown to be a "link in a chain" of 
distribution. Pelton, 801 P.2d at 185. 
Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at^[13 n.6. 
In this case the state failed to present evidence that Butler took active steps "in 
furtherance" of or to facilitate a distribution. Id. at ^[10. His conduct did not lead to or 
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result in a drug deal. The state failed to present evidence that Butler engaged in conduct 
knowing or intending that a distribution "would, or would be likely to, occur." Id. at f9. 
As in Hester, the intent of others in transacting a distribution cannot be imputed to Butler. 
See id. at T| 14. The conviction for facilitating a drug distribution should be reversed. 
2. The Marshaled Evidence Fails to Support that Butler Facilitated a Drug 
Distribution. 
The marshaled evidence in this case reflects that the driver of the van, Detective 
Johnson, observed Butler make a "head nod" gesture to the van when the officers first 
drove northbound on 500 West from 300 to 200 South. (R. 104:57). Johnson also 
testified that Butler made the same head nod when the van circled around to make a 
second pass at the area. (R. 104:57). 
After the van pulled over, Butler and Smith both approached the passenger's side 
window at the same time and made contact with Detective Boelter. (R. 104:27, 32, 35, 
58, 72, 84). Boelter and Smith had a conversation where Smith asked Boelter what he 
wanted, and Boelter answered "rock," meaning crack cocaine. (R. 104:28). Butler said, 
"How much you want? A hundred? They are big rocks." (R. 104:28, 35). Boelter said, 
"How about 60," and Smith said "Okay, be right back." (R. 104:28). Smith walked away 
and Jones approached with the rock cocaine. (R. 104:29, 30, 32, 73). Jones put three 
rocks in Boelter's hand and he told Boelter not to drive off. (R. 104:30, 59). 
Butler continued to stand at the passenger's side window. (R. 104:32, 73). He 
observed the entire transaction. (R. 104:32). 
In short, Butler's actions consisted of twice gesturing to the van to pull over; 
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approaching the van; asking, "How much you want? A hundred? They are big rocks"; 
and standing at the van as he observed the transaction between Boelter, Smith, and Jones. 
The marshaled evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict fails to 
support that Butler facilitated the arranging offense that transpired in this case. For the 
state to prove its case, the evidence would have to support not only that Butler made a 
statement about cocaine, but also that his conduct constituted an active step "in 
furtherance" of a distribution, Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at J^10, and he engaged in the 
conduct with the knowledge/intent that a distribution "would, or would be likely to, 
occur." See id at ^9; Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924. 
In this case, there is no evidence to suggest that if Boelter had dealt with Butler— 
rather than Smith—that Butler could have facilitated a drug distribution, or that his 
conduct could or would have resulted "in the distribution of a controlled substance." 
Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at [^10. Butler's actions were his own. He had no interaction 
with the other street dealers in this case. The evidence fails to support Butler's intent or 
ability if Boelter had pursued matters with him. 
Specifically, undisputed evidence presented by the state's witnesses supports that 
while Butler and Smith approached the passenger's side window together, Butler did not 
say anything to Smith or the other individuals working with Smith that night, he did not 
motion or gesture to any of the other men, and he did not interact with them. (See R. 
104:35-36; see also 104:17-48 (Boelter's testimony); 104:55-68 (Johnson's testimony); 
104:69-81 (Kirkwood's testimony); 104:81-88 (Holmes' testimony)). 
Also, based on Boelter's description of a typical drug transaction, Butler was an 
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interloper. He played no role in the arranging offense that occurred between Smith and 
Boelter. See Ontiveros, 674 P.2d at 104 (recognizing the "classic case of arranging," 
where the defendant acts as agent for the buyer in dealing with the supplier). 
Indeed, Boelter testified that in the typical case, "[t]he individual [who] 
approaches the car to make the transaction or the original transaction generally does not 
hold the drugs on them at that time. They have somebody else in the area that has it." 
(R. 104:31). Based on the facts presented at trial here, that role arguably would describe 
either Butler or Smith, since they each approached the van when it pulled over and they 
both made statements about "rock" or cocaine. (See R. 104:27-28, 32); see also Hester, 
2000 UT App 159 at ^ | 2 , 10, 13-14 (where defendant made contact with the undercover 
agent and had a conversation about cocaine, that was insufficient for arranging offense). 
Boelter also stated that once the original person has negotiated a transaction, 
that individual will go to wherever the source of the narcotics is held, the drugs are 
held, obtain whatever deal was made, and then bring them back to the vehicle. 
The reason for that is if that individual gets arrested at the car, then the individual 
that actually has the larger quantity of drugs is not arrested. He is out of the area a 
little bit more. So they don't lose the whole stash of drugs, as opposed to one or 
two rocks that they sold, I guess. 
(R. 104:31-32,46-47). Those actions would constitute the crime of arranging. See 
Ontiveros, 674 P.2d at 104 (recognizing the "classic case" of arranging, where the 
defendant acts as an agent for the buyer in dealing with the supplier). 
In this case, Smith committed the arranging offense. He proceeded as described 
by Boelter, and once the deal was struck, Smith went to "wherever the source of the 
narcotics was held." (R. 104:31). He went to "get somebody else." (R. 104:32). That 
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person was the supplier, Jones. Jones brought the rocks to the van and gave three to 
Boelter. (R. 104:32). Smith and Jones were working a typical drug deal as described by 
Boelter. (See also R. 104:31, 43). 
According to the marshaled evidence, Butler made a statement about cocaine. His 
statement did not bring Boelter and Smith together and it did not bring Boelter and Jones 
together for the transaction. See Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923-24 (where defendant took 
buyer to a restaurant where the supplier was); Gallegos, 851 P.2d at 1190 (where 
defendant made phone calls regarding drugs); Clark, 783 P.2d at 68-69 (where defendant 
drove around looking for supplier); Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at [^13 n.6. Also, there is 
no evidence to support that even if Butler had the intent, his conduct "would, or would be 
likely to," lead to any kind of distribution. Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at ^ [9. 
Butler had no relationship to Smith and the other individuals; he did not facilitate 
the contact between Boelter and Jones; his conduct did not reveal that he had a plan if 
Boelter had transacted a deal with him rather than Smith; there is no indication that he 
was working with someone who would bring drugs to the van if he had struck his own 
deal; he was not seen or heard conferring with known drug suppliers (R. 104:17-48); he 
was not in possession of incriminating items (R. 104:37-38); and he did not have a pager 
or cellular phone to support an ability to bring a buyer and supplier together (see R. 
104:37-38, 17-48). See Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at ^13 n.6. 
In addition, the intent of Smith, Jones and Boelter cannot be imputed to Butler. In 
order to hold Butler criminally liable for the conduct of others, the state must present 
evidence of an aiding-and-abetting relationship between Butler and Smith or Jones. See 
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American Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, ffi[6-7, 12 P.3d 108 (stating that mere 
presence at a crime will not support a conviction; for participation, the fact-finder will 
consider defendant's "presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the 
offense") (emphasis added); State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983) ("A defendant 
can be criminally responsible for an act committed by another, but the degree of his 
responsibility is determined by his own mental state in the acts that subject him to such 
responsibility, not by the mental state of the actorn); State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 
1224 (Utah 1983) (conviction cannot be had on basis of transferred intent or guilt by 
association); see also State ex rel. V.T. v. V.T., 2000 UT App 189,^10-11, 5 P.3d 1234; 
State v. Labium, 959 P.2d 120, 123-24 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (stating that mere presence 
is not sufficient to impose criminal liability on a party, and citing to State v. Kerekes, 622 
P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980)). 
Here, the state could have met its burden by producing evidence that Butler had 
some association or relationship with Smith, Jones and Williams in connection with the 
transaction. See, e.g. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277 at \6. Yet, the state produced none. (See 
R. 104:35-36 (specifically acknowledging that Butler did not say anything to Smith or the 
other individuals working with Smith that night, he did not motion or gesture to any of 
the other men, and he did not have any interaction with them); see also 104:17-48 
(Boelter's testimony); 104:55-68 (Johnson's testimony); 104:69-81 (Kirkwood's 
testimony); 104:81-88 (Holmes' testimony)). 
Likewise, the state could have met its burden by producing evidence that Butler 
could facilitate a transaction, for example, where he had an associate waiting in the 
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background with drugs, or he had the ability to contact a supplier. See Harrison, 601 
P.2d 923-24 (where defendant took buyer to a restaurant to meet the supplier); Gallegos, 
851 P.2d at 1190 (where defendant made phone calls regarding drugs); Clark, 783 P.2d at 
68-69 (where defendant drove around looking for drugs); Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at 
[^13 n.6. Yet, the state produced none. 
Butler was not a "link in [the] chain" of Smith's distribution to Boelter. Pelton, 
801 P.2d at 185. He was an interloper. Any correlation between Butler and Smith's 
arrangement is tenuous. "On the record before us, trying to discern [defendant's] 
intentions at the time of his arrest would be an exercise in pure speculation." Hester, 
2000 UT App 159 at fl4. The evidence is "so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime.'" Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136 at TflO (quoting Smith, 927 P.2d at 651). The 
evidence required the jury to take speculative leaps, and to base the verdict solely on 
inferences and remote possibilities that Butler had some unspecified connection with 
Smith and Jones. 
In this case, a transaction occurred, and drugs changed hands; however, Butler was 
not a facilitator for, or instrumental to, the transaction. See, e.g. Renfro, 735 P.2d at 44 
(where defendant went into another room and returned with a shaving kit containing 
marijuana when the undercover agent made a request for the drugs); Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 
at 103-04 (recognizing the "classic case" of arranging where defendant made a telephone 
call, then directed the undercover agent to the location of the supplier, procured the 
money from the agent, and returned with drugs for the agent); Hicken, 659 P.2d at 1039 
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(where defendant telephoned the supplier, confirmed the details of the transaction, and 
drove the buyer to the supplier's home); Pelton, 801 P.2d at 185 (where defendant 
directed the undercover agent to the location where the supplier was); Clark, 783 P.2d at 
68-69 (where the defendant made a telephone call and drove around looking for the 
supplier in connection with the agent's request for drugs). Whether Butler had the ability 
to facilitate a transaction of his own will never be known. 
The evidence here failed to support that Butler took active steps "in furtherance" 
of a distribution. It failed to support that he engaged in conduct knowing or intending 
that a distribution "would, or would be likely to, occur." Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at ^ 9. 
Butler respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction for insufficient 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant Franklin Butler requests that this Court 
reverse the conviction. 
SUBMITTED this p ) 8 day of v J U H e , , 2006. 
Linda M. Jones (j 
Andrea Garland 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 11:51 
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ADDENDUM B 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2005) 
58-37-8. Prohib i ted acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penal t ies : 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(hi) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 'or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, orvany other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified i n Schedule I or II, a controlled substance 
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is 
guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(hi) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and UXJOIT a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by lawj but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practi-
tioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) 
subsequent to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be 
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection 
(2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled 
substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted 
to a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to 
run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in 
an offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2j(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally 
having in his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; 
and 
(11) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a 
negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 
76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veter-
inarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iiij to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 
76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the trans-
port, delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section 
to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined 
in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty 
of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any 
person who, acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, 
coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a 
violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and m the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(aj any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985, 
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
§ 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 95, § 1; 
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch. 
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1; 
1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
§ 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1995, ch. 284, § 1; 
1996, ch. 1, § 8; 1997, ch. 64, § 6; 1998, ch. 
139, § 1; 1999, ch. 12, § 1; 1999, ch. 303, § 1; 
2003, ch. 10, § 1; 2003, ch. 33, § 6; 2004, ch. 
36, § 1; 2005, ch. 30, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amend-
ment by ch. 10, effective May 5, 2003, added 
Subsection (2)(g) and made a related change. 
The 2003 amendment by ch. 33, effective May 
5, 2003. added "gamma hydroxybutyric acid as 
listed m Schedule III" in Subsection (l)(b)(i), 
making a related change; added "controlled 
substances analog or a" in Subsection (2)(a)(i); 
and substituted "or on the grounds of a house of 
woiship as defined in Section 76-10-501" for "a 
church or synagogue" in Subsection (4)(a)(vi). 
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, 
redesignated former Subsection (2)(c) as (2)(e) 
and added "and if the conviction is with respect 
to controlled substances as listed in" and Sub-
sections (2)(ej(i) and (n); added "trier of fact 
finds the" in Subsection (4)(a); added Subsec-
tions (4)(a)(xi) and (d); and made related 
changes. 
The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, 
in Subsection (2)(c), substituted fca person's 
conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) 
subsequent to a conviction under Subsection 
d)(a)"for "a second or subsequent conviction of 
possession of any controlled substance by a 
person." 
